



14 000232760

~~TOP SECRET~~

DD/S&T - 0213-64

7 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Secretary McNamara, Secretary Vance,
and Dr. Fubini

I gave Vance my letter of August 7 in reply to his of July 29th. Fubini, after reading the letter, protested the need for working on the design of the spacecraft, stating that weight was no problem because of the availability of TITAN III which would give a payload of 8,000# in the initial version and 24,000# in the TITAN IHC. I said this was all new to me as I had no knowledge of the availability of TITAN III, had no schedule of production, and therefore I had not taken this into account. Fubini went on at great length and in a disconnected manner on the availability of TITAN III and problems of using TITAN II, none of which came through very clearly to me. This particular part of the conversation ended with my stating that I would discuss the matter with Wheelon, get his views on the need to proceed with this spacecraft design, though it was most certainly important to proceed [redacted] and probably this work should go ahead.

25X1
NRO

25X1
NRO

The Land Panel is to meet at Cambridge on [redacted] on Monday, August 10. I think Dr. Wheelon or somebody on his staff should attend this meeting and this arrangement should be worked out with Dr. McMillan. If there is any problem on this, let me know.

25X1D

Fubini then left and McNamara, Vance and I had lunch. With respect to NRO matters I stated that my observation on NRO was that it was not properly equipped technically, either in the Pentagon or on General Greer's staff. They were not utilizing the technical capabilities of CIA, went on to discuss the extent to which I have built up the DD/S&T of CIA, and the level of competence which I had achieved, as represented by the expressions of the Hyland Panel. I said I felt it was in the best interests of the government to utilize this facility and if it was not utilized, it would quickly disappear. Vance took the position we were building a very large scientific staff. I said, "no" - that it was modest in size, that I had gone over the budget and went over the chart which I intend to present to the President's Board this afternoon.

s

NRO and OSD
review(s) completed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

I then voiced objections to the NRO program. McNamara quickly countered by stating that between now and the end of the year, at which time he expects Dr. McMillan to leave, he intends to move the NRO into the Office of the Secretary of Defense under his Deputy for Research and Engineering, equip it with the proper technical staff, and then work out a proper means of utilizing the capabilities of the CIA and the Air Force. He was not very clear as to how this would be done; in any event he was categorical in his statement that this change would be made.

25X1D

McNamara questioned me as to whether I had been briefed on the TITAN III and whether its availability had been considered by CIA in developing [] I said I knew nothing about it and it had only been mentioned to me most casually and I was not sure whether it had been discussed with CIA staff. If it had been, they were not given the impression that it might be available for a new reconnaissance system. McNamara stated that he wanted CIA fully briefed on the availability of the TITAN III and he wanted to know what improvements with respect to the [] system and its dependability would result from larger payloads.

25X1D

JAM/mfb

ILLEGIB

Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP71B00508R000100100035-8

Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP71B00508R000100100035-8